Mints Identity
Identity for every principal in your organization.
W3C decentralized identifiers with human-rooted lineage. FROST threshold signing that requires no single trusted keyholder. Hardware-backed WebAuthn for humans, verifiable DIDs for agents — one identity layer for every principal.
DIDs · FROST / MPC · WebAuthn · multi-chain keys
Lineage — humans and agents, one root
Cross-lineage requests are rejected at the protocol layer — no configuration required.
Principal kinds — human, organization, agent
FROST threshold — no single point of key compromise
Human root per lineage — every agent traces here
Who is a principal?
Three kinds. One lineage model.
Every entity Mints recognizes — human, organization, or agent — gets a W3C DID. Every DID traces to a human root through a cryptographically-signed lineage chain.
did:oas:…:hmr
Human member root. The accountability anchor for every lineage.
did:oas:…:enr
Entity node root. Groups agents under one human-rooted lineage.
did:oas:…:agent
Autonomous actor. Provably traces to a human root — always.
Lineage isolation
Every agent traces to a human root.
Cross-lineage access fails closed at the protocol layer. There is no ACL to misconfigure, no permission to grant and forget. One organization cannot fund, view, or direct another organization's agents.
Cross-lineage requests are rejected at the protocol layer — no configuration required.
Lineage is cryptographic, not configurable
The proof that an agent belongs to your organization is derived from signed key material, not from a database row. Tampering breaks the signature — there is nothing to mis-set.
Accountability always traces to a human
Any action an agent takes — payment, escrow, credential request — is traceable to the human root who owns that lineage. There are no anonymous autonomous actors in Mints.
Threshold key management
m-of-n signing. No single point of compromise.
FROST threshold signatures split key material across multiple keyholders. A quorum must cooperate to produce a valid signature — but no keyholder ever assembles the full key.
FROST threshold ceremony
No single keyholder holds a complete key. Shards combine only at signing time, never stored together.
No single point of key compromise
Individual key shards are mathematically insufficient. An attacker would need to compromise multiple independent keyholders simultaneously.
Shards never stored together
Threshold parties store their shards independently. Mints coordinates the ceremony — it never holds a shard, and the full key is never reconstructed in one place.
One DID, threshold-backed
The threshold key is bound to a single DID. Counterparties verify the DID — they need not know how many keyholders underpin it.
A quorum that must cooperate is safer than a secret that must be kept.
Asking 'who is this agent?' should have a provable answer — not a policy lookup.
Human authentication
WebAuthn. Hardware-bound. Phish-proof.
Human operators in Mints authenticate with modern multi-factor methods — including hardware security keys and platform authenticators. Passwords are not in the model.
Mints Identity
Hardware-bound, phish-proof, verifiable
Password-based auth
Replayable, breachable, unverifiable
Method 01
Hardware security keys
FIDO2-compliant hardware keys (YubiKey, Titan, etc.) store credential private keys in tamper-resistant silicon. The key never leaves the device.
Method 02
Platform authenticators
Touch ID, Face ID, and Windows Hello backed by the Secure Enclave or TPM. Fast, biometric, hardware-bound.
Method 03
TOTP as a second factor
Time-based one-time passwords available as a second factor where hardware authenticators are not practical. Phishing-resistant methods are always preferred.
Key lifecycle
Generate, bind, attest, sign, rotate.
Every key material lifecycle is audited. Generation is local, attestation is hardware-backed, rotation produces an immutable event — nothing is hidden or undocumented.
Generate
Ed25519 key material generated on-device via a CSPRNG. Never leaves the hardware boundary.
Bind to DID
The public key is registered to the principal's W3C DID document. The binding is signed and timestamped.
Attest
Hardware attestation (FIDO2 / Secure Enclave) proves the key was generated on genuine hardware.
Sign
Operations are signed locally. Mints verifies the signature; it never sees the private key.
Rotate
Key rotation appends a new binding to the DID document. The old key is revoked with an immutable event.
Generate
Ed25519 key material generated on-device via a CSPRNG. Never leaves the hardware boundary.
Bind to DID
The public key is registered to the principal's W3C DID document. The binding is signed and timestamped.
Attest
Hardware attestation (FIDO2 / Secure Enclave) proves the key was generated on genuine hardware.
Sign
Operations are signed locally. Mints verifies the signature; it never sees the private key.
Rotate
Key rotation appends a new binding to the DID document. The old key is revoked with an immutable event.
Multi-chain key management
One identity layer, every chain your treasury touches.
Mints Identity manages key material across chains without fragmenting your identity model. The same DID binds the same principal regardless of which chain an operation settles on.
Chain-agnostic DID
The OAS DID is chain-agnostic. The same identity works on Ethereum, Solana, or any other chain Mints supports — no chain-specific identity silos.
HKDF key derivation
Chain-specific key material is derived from a master key using HKDF-SHA256, so your key hierarchy is auditable and deterministic.
BIP-44 / SLIP-0010 paths
Hierarchical key derivation follows standard paths. You can independently verify key derivation — no proprietary black box.
Unified audit trail
Every key derivation, rotation, and signing event across all chains appears in the same immutable event log — one audit for every chain.
Threshold on any chain
FROST threshold signing is chain-agnostic at the cryptographic layer. Treasury quorums work identically regardless of settlement chain.
Guardian recovery across chains
Guardian-based key recovery works across your entire key hierarchy — losing a device does not mean losing your multi-chain treasury.
Related service
Mints Custody
Identity binds the keys. Custody decides who can use them for treasury operations. m-of-n quorums, guardian recovery, and policy-gated signing — built on the same lineage model.
API documentation
Identity API reference
DID resolution, session management, WebAuthn credential registration, threshold ceremony coordination, and key rotation — all documented in the API reference.
Every principal deserves a verifiable identity.
Mints Identity is in early access. Bring your agent fleet — or just yourself.